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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether abortion is constitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment. Essentially, the Supreme Court used what is known as the “right to privacy” 
which they created using the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments finding penumbras of 
the Bill of Rights, and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This study addresses the history of the right to privacy and tries to show that the 
Supreme Court stretched the meaning of these Amendments beyond what the founders of the 
Constitution intended. This study analyzed the application of the Fourth Amendment in the cases 
of Olmstead v. United States, Griswold v. Connecticut and Katz v. United States, in order to 
show the evolution of the Fourth Amendment. Using dissenting opinions from the cases this 
study attempts to show that the so called “right to privacy” is unconstitutional and therefore, the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to abortion, thereby making the same unconstitutional. The 
study did discover that although the Supreme Court has declared abortion Constitutional in the 
case of Roe v. Wade, strong arguments could be made against its Constitutionality. In so doing, 
this study tries to show that if no general right to privacy exists, then abortion is unconstitutional. 
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The Constitutionality of Abortion 
In examining the current topic, it is essential to examine the Supreme Court’s rational 
regarding the matter. It is important to examine the opinions of the Supreme Court as they have 
been granted what is known as Judicial Review which comes from the Supreme Court case of 
Marbury v. Madison. In this case the Supreme Court stated in applicable parts: 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. 
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply 
to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; 
the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the 
very essence of judicial duty. (Marbury v. Madison, 1803) 
Essentially, the Supreme Court is stating that it is their duty to interpret the law. The Supreme 
Court is not only arguing that it may interpret laws made but also the Constitution itself. In 
interpreting laws, the Supreme Court has ruled in many cases leading up to the famous Roe v. 
Wade decision which attacked Texas statutes in which the court held “improperly invade a right, 
said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy” (Roe v. 
Wade, 1973). Leading up to this decision were several other cases which created precedent in 
which the Supreme Court used in making its decision in Roe v. Wade. In determining the 
constitutionality of abortion, it is essential that these cases are examined.  
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Olmstead v. United States and the Protection of Places 
Over the history of the United States, various amendments have been applied in various 
ways as the Supreme Court continues to interpret and refine the law. In order to understand the 
Fourth Amendment as it was applied by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, early cases dealing 
with Fourth Amendment issues must be examined. Olmstead v. United States is a 1928 case 
which the Supreme Court cited in Roe v. Wade which deals with this issue. In Olmstead, the 
defendants’ telephones were tapped; however, no trespassing on the defendants’ property 
occurred (Olmstead v. United States, 1928). The Supreme Court held that because no trespassing 
occurred, the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, and stated “U.S. Const. 
amend. IV was not violated unless there was an official search and seizure of a person, or such a 
seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house 
or curtilage for the purpose of making a seizure” (Olmstead v. United States, 1928). What is 
important to note here is that the Supreme Court is placing emphasis on the protection of places 
over people. The Court is arguing that in order for the Fourth Amendment to protect a person, 
there must be a physical invasion of a person or person’s property. Therefore, the emphasis is 
placed upon the protection of a place and not a person in Olmstead v. United States. However, as 
will be examined the Supreme Court shifted its stance on the Fourth Amendment and created 
what is known as the “right to privacy” in later cases which paved the way for the Fourth 
Amendment to be applied to Roe v. Wade.  
Griswold v. Connecticut and the Origins of the “Right to Privacy” 
In the Supreme Court Case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court stated: 
A Connecticut statute made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense. The executive 
and medical directors of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut were convicted 
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in the Circuit Court for the Sixth Circuit in New Haven, Connecticut, on a charge of 
having violated the statute as accessories by giving information, instruction, and advice to 
married persons as to the means of preventing conception. The Appellate Division of the 
Circuit Court affirmed, and its judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Errors of 
Connecticut. (151 Conn 544, 200 A2d 479.). (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965) 
Essentially, the married persons in this case were given advice regarding how to prevent 
conception by the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut which was then convicted for 
doing so. When the case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court, the Court held that: 
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 630, as protection against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's 
home and the privacies of life." We recently referred in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, 
to the Fourth Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other 
right carefully and particularly reserved to the people." See Beaney, The Constitutional 
Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 216 (1960). (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965) 
In examining these amendments, the Supreme Court references in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the Fourth Amendment and states:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. (Fourth Amendment) 
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The Fourth Amendment is discussing searches and seizures. While it is arguable that this 
amendment does create a right to privacy of sorts, this right is to protect citizens from having 
their things being searched without a warrant. This is thereby an amendment addressing criminal 
law and says nowhere that citizens have a broad “right to privacy”. Which would pertain to 
abortion or any other matter unless it concerns a search or seizure, and of course an abortion is 
neither of these. The Fifth Amendment states: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. (Fifth Amendment) 
The Fifth Amendment pertains to the matter of privacy even less than the Fourth does as the 
Fifth Amendment prevents a person from testifying against him or herself while the Fourth 
Amendment deals with unlawful searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment discusses some 
more criminal matters, discusses what is known as the due process clause, and does discuss the 
fact that a person may not be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” 
(Fifth Amendment). However, testifying against oneself has nothing to do with privacy and 
therefore does not grant a “right to privacy.” As a result, the Supreme Court has had to use an 
extremely broad interpretation of the Constitution in order to create this notion of a right to 
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut using the Fifth Amendment. As aforementioned, the Supreme 
Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut that “The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in 
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Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against all governmental invasions "of 
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). These 
amendments, as just examined, have nothing to do with a general “right to privacy.” The Fourth 
Amendment pertains to unlawful searches and seizures. This does create a type of privacy but the 
only privacy the amendment mentions is privacy from an unlawful search or seizure. The Fifth 
Amendment prevents a person from testifying against him or herself and makes no mention of 
privacy of any sort. Therefore, the Supreme Court took an extremely broad interpretation of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments in Boyd v. United States and in Griswold v. Connecticut when it 
quoted Boyd in Griswold. The portion from Boyd quoted in Griswold states in applicable parts: 
“The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 
as protection against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the 
privacies of life” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). This quote uses the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments as support for the creation of privacy used to permit the unmarried couple in 
Griswold to use contraceptives. However, as just examined the Fourth Amendment protects 
against unlawful searches and seizures while the Fifth Amendment protects a person from being 
forced to testify against him or herself. Yet, the Supreme Court explains in Boyd that these two 
amendments protect “against all governmental invasions” and uses this same quote as support in 
Griswold (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). The wording of these two amendments was just 
examined and neither of these amendments say anywhere in them “citizens are protected against 
all governmental invasions.” Instead, they protect against unlawful searches and seizures and 
prevent a person from being forced to testify against him or herself. Therefore, a right to privacy 
protecting citizens from all governmental invasions does not exist under the Fourth or Fifth 
Amendments. 
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The Right of Privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut as Compared to Boyd v. United States 
As examined previously, in Olmstead v. United States emphasis was placed upon the 
protection of places over people, however in Griswold, “The right of privacy to use birth control 
measures was found to be a legitimate one” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). This is a protection 
of a person as opposed to a place. Additionally, as examined, the Supreme Court in Griswold 
cited Boyd v. United States when they quoted “The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were 
described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against all governmental 
invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 
1965). However, Boyd in describing the right to privacy states in applicable parts: 
They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its 
adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and 
its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the 
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of 
the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal 
liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of 
some public offence, -- it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and 
constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment (Boyd v. United States, 1886). 
As can be seen in this citation from Boyd the Supreme Court in Boyd applied the Fourth 
Amendment and the right to privacy to searches and seizures and the protection of a person’s real 
property. The citation from Boyd mentions the right to the “privacies of life” but makes no 
explicit mention of a right to privacy which is applicable to the protection of people. Yet, in 
Griswold the majority opinion interprets these “privacies of life” to mean that people themselves 
have a “right to privacy” in any and all circumstances. 
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Justice Black’s Dissenting Opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut 
Justice Black addresses the right of privacy in his dissenting opinion and challenges this 
broad interpretation of a general “right to privacy” when he states: 
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though there is some 
constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might 
abridge the "privacy" of individuals. But there is not. There are, of course, guarantees in 
certain specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy at 
certain times and places with respect to certain activities. Such, for example, is the Fourth 
Amendment's guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures." But I think it 
belittles that Amendment to talk about it as though it protects nothing but "privacy." To 
treat it that way is to give it a niggardly interpretation, not the kind of liberal reading I 
think any Bill of Rights provision should be given….” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965) 
Justice Black does an excellent job of pointing out that there is no general “right to privacy.” He 
explains that the notion that laws cannot be made which violate a person’s privacy is 
unconstitutional. He further explains that the Fourth Amendment was designed to be applied to 
the protection of a person’s belongings, and pertains to searches and seizures as opposed to it 
creating a blanket right to privacy which prevents any and all government invasion. He also 
points out that the Court talks about the Fourth Amendment as if it will protect against any 
invasion of privacy whatsoever, but he explains that this is not the case but that there are specific 
circumstances where a person’s privacy is protected.  This is not an arbitrary standard as he 
points out that unreasonable “searches and seizures” are unconstitutional. Ultimately, Justice 
Black challenges the majority opinion in Griswold on the grounds that this notion of a right to 
privacy which protections people arbitrarily is unconstitutional.  
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Katz v. United States and the Application of the Right to Privacy 
In analyzing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s application of the Fourth Amendment 
leading up to Roe v. Wade, the next case which should be examined is Katz v. United States. This 
case came before the Supreme Court two years after Griswold v. Connecticut. In Katz the 
Supreme Court stated in applicable parts as follows: 
Defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation 
of a federal statute. At the trial, the government was permitted, over defendant's 
objection, to introduce evidence of defendant's end of telephone conversations, which 
was overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording 
device to the outside of the public telephone booth where he had placed his calls. A court 
of appeals, in affirming his conviction, rejected the contention that the recordings had 
been obtained in violation of U.S. Const. amend. IV because there was no physical 
entrance into the area occupied by defendant. (Katz v. United States, 1967) 
The primary issue the Supreme Court dealt with in the case was “Whether a public telephone 
booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic 
listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to 
privacy of the user of the booth” (Katz v. United States, 1967). The Supreme Court stated in 
applicable parts as follows: 
the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by 
incantation of the phrase "constitutionally protected area." Secondly, the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional "right to privacy." That 
Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, 
but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other 
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provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental 
invasion. But the protection of a person's general right to privacy -- his right to be let 
alone by other people -- is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left 
largely to the law of the individual States. (Katz v. United States, 1967) 
As noted, numerous times throughout this study, the Supreme Court relied heavily upon the right 
of privacy in Roe v. Wade. However, the Court noted in Roe v. Wade that: 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the United 
States Supreme Court recognizes that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of 
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution, and that the roots of 
that right may be found in the First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in 
the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, and in the concept of 
liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Roe v. Wade, 1973)  
The Supreme Court argues in Roe v. Wade, that through the various amendments which have 
been examined in this study, zones of privacy are created and essentially the Supreme Court has 
decided that abortion falls under one of these zones. However, the Supreme Court earlier noted 
in Katz v. United States, that there is no such thing as a general constitutional “right to privacy” 
(Katz v. United States, 1967). Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in Katz v. United States that 
the Fourth Amendment protects against certain forms of governmental intrusion not all (Katz v. 
United States, 1967). However, the wording of the Fourth Amendment was examined and the 
only governmental invasion which is protects against is unlawful searches and seizures. This 
simply does not have to do with any other form of privacy whatsoever. As a result, the Supreme 
Court erred in Katz when it stated, “Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy 
from other forms of governmental invasion.” (Katz v. United States, 1967). The Fourth 
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Amendment is the only Amendment which discusses privacy from governmental invasion, and 
since there is no other constitutional support for protection of personal privacy the Supreme 
Court erred in its analysis in Katz. The Supreme Court finally held in Katz v. United States, that 
there is no general right to privacy and that privacy is left largely to the states to decide upon 
(Katz v. United States, 1967). Thus, in comparing the holdings of the Supreme Court in both 
Katz v. United States and Roe v. Wade, the Court seems to take a more strict interpretation of the 
Constitution in Katz v. United States and a significantly more loose interpretation of the same in 
Roe v. Wade. Arguably in Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court gets so far away from the literal 
meaning of the Constitution that it would seem there truly is no constitutional right to privacy as 
the Court said as much in Katz. v. United States.  
Justice Black’s Dissenting Opinion in Katz v. United States 
The majority opinion in Katz held that “One who occupied a telephone booth, shut the door 
behind him, and paid the toll that permitted him to place a call was entitled to assume that the 
words he uttered into the mouthpiece would not be broadcast to the world” (Katz v. United 
States, 1967). Essentially, the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 
had been violated regardless of the fact that there was no physical entrance in the area occupied 
by the defendant. Justice Black again dissents in Katz just as he did in Griswold v. Connecticut 
with many of the same objections he had with Griswold. He begins his dissenting opinion with 
“If I could agree with the Court that eavesdropping carried on by electronic means (equivalent to 
wiretapping) constitutes a "search" or "seizure," I would be happy to join the Court's opinion” 
(Katz v. United States, 1967). Justice Black recognizes that in order for a Fourth Amendment 
violation to occur there must be an actual “search” or “seizure” which occurs without a warrant. 
Justice Black then states: 
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My basic objection is twofold: (1) I do not believe that the words of the Amendment will 
bear the meaning given them by today's decision, and (2) I do not believe that it is the 
proper role of this Court to rewrite the Amendment in order "to bring it into harmony 
with the times" and thus reach a result that many people believe to be desirable. (Katz v. 
United States, 1967) 
Justice Black then quotes the Fourth Amendment and then analyzes its wording by stating: 
The first clause protects "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures . . . ." These words connote the idea of tangible things with size, 
form, and weight, things capable of being searched, seized, or both. The second clause of 
the Amendment still further establishes its Framers' purpose to limit its protection to 
tangible things by providing that no warrants shall issue but those "particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." A conversation 
overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible 
and, under the normally accepted meanings of the words, can neither be searched nor 
seized. (Katz v. United States, 1967) 
Therefore, Justice Black again argues just as he did in Griswold, that this idea of a general “right 
to privacy” does not exist. He argues that the Fourth Amendment applies specifically to physical 
searches and seizures and does not create a general “right to privacy” which can be applied 
arbitrarily. Justice Black also argues that the Court has interpreted the words of the Fourth 
Amendment in a way which they were not meant to be interpreted in order to please the majority 
of people as he states “I do not believe that it is the proper role of this Court to rewrite the 
Amendment in order “to bring it into harmony with the times”’ (Katz v. United States, 1967). As 
has been seen in both Griswold and Katz, and as Justice Black has pointed out, the Supreme 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABORTION 15 
Court seems to evolve the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and apply it in a way which it is 
not intended to be applied. Initially, in the case of Olmstead the court did use the Fourth 
Amendment as it was intended but have shifted it in order to create a general “right to privacy.” 
As will be examined, these cases which have been analyzed were cited in Roe v. Wade, and this 
notion of a general right to privacy is the main instrument used by the court to legalize abortion. 
As Justice Black quotes the Fourth Amendment, he states that ‘The first clause protects “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures….”’ (Katz v. United 
States, 1967). As can be noted, the protection of persons, houses, and effects from unreasonable 
searches and seizures does not equate to unborn children. The Fourth Amendment makes 
absolutely no mention of unborn children. However, the Supreme Court used the “right to 
privacy” which was synthesized, as examined, using the Fourth Amendment, to justify the 
legalization of abortion. 
Roe v. Wade and the “Right of Privacy” 
Essentially, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that there exists a right of privacy in 
the Constitution. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that this so-called “right of privacy” 
applies to a women having an abortion, and that she is protected under the Constitution through 
this right of privacy in the area choosing whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. In 
describing this right of privacy, the Supreme Court held that: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of 
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court 
determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 
(Roe v. Wade, 1973) 
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The Fourteenth Amendment states in applicable parts: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. (14th Amendment) 
As previously stated, the Supreme Court has held in Roe v. Wade that the Constitution is broad 
enough that it allows a woman to terminate her pregnancy if she should so choose under the 
“right to privacy.” However, as also stated, the Fourteenth Amendment explains that the states 
are not permitted to make laws which would “abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens” 
(14th Amendment). The Supreme Court is thereby taking an extremely broad view of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and essentially deciding that these “privileges or immunities of citizens” 
create the so-called right to privacy (14th Amendment). However, it could equally be argued that 
these do not create a right to privacy. Just as Justice Black pointed out in Griswold “The Court 
talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though there is some constitutional provision or 
provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" of 
individuals. But there is not” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). Justice Black makes an excellent 
point. For example, laws which prevent a person from stealing are deemed by the government to 
be constitutional, as a result, the government has determined that these do not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment as stealing is not deemed to be a “privilege or immunity” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black points out that there is no absolute law which prevents all 
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governmental invasion in the lives of citizens. The Supreme Court then has determined in Roe 
that for a woman to choose to seek an abortion constitutes one of these “privileges or 
immunities.” However, the Supreme Court has arbitrarily made that decision since there is no 
specific provision in the Constitution that outlines which things citizens should have privileges 
or immunities from. 
In examining the Ninth Amendment as referenced in Roe v. Wade, it states in applicable 
parts: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people” (Ninth Amendment). The Supreme Court again takes a 
broad view of the Constitution as it argued that in addition to the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Ninth Amendment also helped to create the “right to privacy.” The Ninth Amendment simply 
explains that there will be certain rights which will be given to the people, and the Supreme 
Court thereby takes an extremely broad interpretation of this amendment when it explains that 
this allows a right to privacy. Again, this is the same thing which occurred with the Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has arbitrarily decided that 
abortion is one of the things which falls under one of the rights which “shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.” (Ninth Amendment). The result of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendment’s is the right of privacy which the 
Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade applied to abortion. Thus, arguments that the Fourteenth and 
Ninth Amendments do not apply to abortion can be made as Justice Black has stated that The 
Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though there is some constitutional 
provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" 
of individuals, but there is not (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). Therefore, it could equally be 
stated that the right to have an abortion does not fall under this protection as the Supreme Court 
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has arbitrarily decided that it does. In order to fully understand the right of privacy it is important 
to look to its origins. These origins lie in the Supreme Court case of Griswold v. Connecticut.  
Compelling State Interest 
The Supreme Court noted in Roe v. Wade three reasons for which criminal abortion laws 
existed prior to the Court’s ruling in the same. The first is that: 
It has been argued occasionally that these laws were the product of a Victorian social 
concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however, does not advance this 
justification in the present case, and it appears that no court or commentator has taken the 
argument seriously. The appellants and amici contend, moreover, that this is not a proper 
state purpose at all and suggest that, if it were, the Texas statutes are overbroad in 
protecting it since the law fails to distinguish between married and unwed mothers. (Roe 
v. Wade, 1973) 
Essentially, the Supreme Court is arguing that the idea that abortion is wrong is an outdated idea 
and that no one really cares about these laws anymore, and thus they argue that abortion should 
be permitted. However, one could argue that the Supreme Court more was arguing from a place 
of personal feelings rather than an unbiased interpretation of the Constitution. The Supreme 
Court then went on to state its second reason which is as follows: 
A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical procedure. When most criminal 
abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman. This 
was particularly true prior to the development of antisepsis. Antiseptic techniques, of 
course, were based on discoveries by Lister, Pasteur, and others first announced in 1867, 
but were not generally accepted and employed until about the turn of the century. 
Abortion mortality was high. Even after 1900, and perhaps until as late as the 
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development of antibiotics in the 1940's, standard modern techniques such as dilation and 
curettage were not nearly so safe as they are today. Thus, it has been argued that a State's 
real concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant woman, that 
is, to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy. 
(Roe v. Wade, 1973) 
In this second reason, the Supreme Court argues that abortion used to be very unsafe to the 
women. They are simply giving the history of abortion and then go on to explain that the other 
reason abortion statutes have been in place so long is that abortions have traditionally been 
unsafe for the women. The Supreme Court then goes on to say that “The State has a legitimate 
interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under 
circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient” (Roe v. Wade, 1973). The Supreme 
Court with this statement is arguing that a state interest exists in that the state must ensure that 
abortions must be treated as any other medical procedure and must not harm the patient. Finally, 
the Supreme Court notes that: 
The third reason is the State's interest -- some phrase it in terms of duty -- in protecting 
prenatal life. Some of the argument for this justification rests on the theory that a new 
human life is present from the moment of conception. The State's interest and general 
obligation to protect life then extends, it is argued, to prenatal life. Only when the life of 
the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her, 
should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail. Logically, of course, a legitimate 
state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins 
at conception or at some other point prior to live birth. In assessing the State's interest, 
recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is 
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involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman 
alone. (Roe v. Wade, 1973) 
This third reason the Supreme Court addresses a second state interest besides the health of the 
women. It is discussing the state interest of protecting prenatal life. During the time of Roe v. 
Wade, it was a theory that life began at conception. If this is the case then the Court reasons that 
it is a legitimate state interest that prenatal life is protected should the states, choose to do so. 
Based upon these three reasons, it can be seen that the Supreme Court is arguing more from a 
place of societal norms rather than a strict interpretation of the law. The first reason simply notes 
that views of abortion being wrong are simply outdated, and society does not care about these 
laws anymore. However, the Supreme Court is to interpret the Constitution not according to 
modern views, but what the founders of the same intended it to mean. The second reason simply 
focuses on the mother’s health and the Supreme Court essentially is arguing that as long as the 
woman is protected, abortion is acceptable. Finally, the Court argues that abortion is a state 
interest as the states may care about prenatal life. However, the Supreme Court did not leave this 
issue up to the states as it held: 
that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional means, of course, that the Texas abortion statutes, as a 
unit, must fall. The exception of Art. 1196 cannot be struck down separately, for then the 
State would be left with a statute proscribing all abortion procedures no matter how 
medically urgent the case. (Roe v. Wade, 1973) 
What this did is essentially invalidate the state abortion statute. The Court also held that the 
Texas statute was overbroad, and essentiall, that it is not a state issue. It is argued however, that 
the Supreme Court erred in its holding in Roe v. Wade. If there truly is a state interest in 
protecting prenatal life, even if “at least potential life is involved,” the states should be able to 
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decide for themselves if abortion shall be permitted. The Supreme Court said itself in Roe v. 
Wade, “Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, regulation limiting these rights may be 
justified only by a "compelling state interest," and legislative enactments must be narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake” (Roe v. Wade, 1973). Essentially, the 
Court held that abortion was not a legitimate state interest for Texas; however, one could argue 
that the Supreme Court erred in its holding as the Court as previously stated, that the interest in 
prenatal life, even if it is only potentially life, is a state interest and the state should be allowed to 
decide upon abortion statutes for itself.  
Justice Rehnquist’s Dissenting Opinion in Roe v. Wade 
As previously examined in addressing the “right to privacy”, the Supreme Court stated in 
Roe v. Wade in applicable parts as follows: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of 
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court 
determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 
(Roe v. Wade, 1973) 
Justice Rehnquist again wrote a dissenting opinion in Roe v. Wade stating: 
Even if there were a plaintiff in this case capable of litigating the issue which the Court 
decides, I would reach a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Court. I have 
difficulty in concluding, as the Court does, that the right of "privacy" is involved in this 
case. Texas, by the statute here challenged, bars the performance of a medical abortion by 
a licensed physician on a plaintiff such as Roe. A transaction resulting in an operation 
such as this is not "private" in the ordinary usage of that word. Nor is the "privacy" that 
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the Court finds here even a distant relative of the freedom from searches and seizures 
protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which the Court has referred to 
as embodying a right to privacy Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). (Roe v. 
Wade, 1973) 
Here Justice Rehnquist argues that the Fourth Amendment applies only to searches and seizures, 
and not to abortion as this is not a search nor a seizure. Furthermore, he argues that the Katz case, 
as cited in Roe, does not apply as that case deal with searches and seizures.  He argues that Roe 
does not have anything to do with this matter. In conclusion, then Justice Rehnquist argues in his 
dissenting opinion that this right to privacy does not apply in Roe. 
Conclusion 
The case of Marbury v. Madison was examined in which the Supreme Court granted 
itself the power of Judicial Review which allowed it to review laws and decide upon their 
constitutionality.  As a result only the Supreme Court may determine whether laws are indeed 
constitutional. The right to privacy was addressed next as it is the main pillar used by the 
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade when the court held that abortion was 
constitutional. The wording of the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments was 
examined as the Supreme Court held that “zones of privacy” exist under these amendments and 
that abortion falls under one of these zones as well as does a woman’s choice whether to 
terminate her pregnancy. 
The Supreme Court of course determines the meaning of the Constitution as Marbury v. 
Madison, has explained, and thus what the Supreme Court decides is final. However, the 
constitutionality of the right to privacy can be challenged. This study analyzed the wording of the 
various amendments discussed in Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut and these 
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amendments do not seem to pertain to the matter of privacy whatsoever. In fact, the Fourth 
Amendment was the only one which discussed a form of privacy, but this only applied to 
searches and seizures being unlawful without a warrant. The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and 
Griswold v. Connecticut took such a broad interpretation of these amendments that they arguable 
erred in their notion that a “right to privacy” exists under the Constitution. 
As has been shown, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court originally applied 
the Fourth Amendment to circumstances concerning searches and seizures. The Supreme Court 
arguably interpreted the amendment the way it was intended to be used in Olmstead as the Court 
held that the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated due to the fact that no 
“actual physical invasion of his house or curtilage for the purpose of making a seizure” 
(Olmstead v. United States, 1928). Olmstead shows the way the Supreme Court used to interpret 
the Fourth Amendment in that it used to apply it only to cases concerning searches and seizures. 
Griswold v. Connecticut was then examined next as the Court begins to expand upon the 
application of the Fourth Amendment. 
Griswold is one of the first cases where the Supreme Court began to apply the Fourth 
Amendment to not only cases involving searches and seizures but to other areas where the Court 
held that a “right of privacy” applied. In the case Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion, 
challenging the majority opinion as unconstitutional. Justice Black argued that “The Court talks 
about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though there is some constitutional provision or 
provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" of 
individuals” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). However, he stated that there was no such right. 
He then went on to argue that the Fourth Amendment may only be applied to cases dealing with 
searches and seizures, and that the Court may not simply declare there is a general “right to 
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privacy” whenever a citizen does not want the government to be involved in his or her business. 
Many of these same issues arose in Katz v. United States and again Justice Black wrote a 
dissenting opinion.  
The majority in Katz held that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights had been 
violated regardless of the fact that there was no physical entrance in the area occupied by the 
defendant. However, Justice Black argued in his dissenting opinion that eavesdropping via an 
electronic device does not constitute a search or seizure, and thus he argued that the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. He even went so far as to say that the Court was 
rewriting the Fourth Amendment in order to update it, and he declared this to be 
unconstitutional. Finally, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Black quoted the Fourth Amendment 
and explained how it is only applicable to searches and seizures and that the Court may not make 
this so called “right to privacy” and apply it to any issue it likes. Essentially, Justice Black 
argued in his dissenting opinion that the only area where privacy is permitted under the Fourth 
Amendment is in the area of searches and seizures. 
Also addressed was the case of Katz v. Unites States. The Supreme Court ruled in this 
case a few years prior to its ruling in Roe v. Wade and seemed to have a different conclusion in 
the former than it did in the latter. In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment cannot be translated as a general “right to privacy.” The Court was also 
careful to ensure it explained that the Fourth Amendment is only to grant privacy in the area of 
searches and seizures without a warrant. The Supreme Court also noted in Katz. v. United States 
that privacy is an issue largely left to the state to legislate. The Supreme Court did note in Roe v. 
Wade that the Constitution makes no explicit mention of a right to privacy but, the Court held 
that zones of privacy exist under the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution. 
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However, as noted, Justice Black explained that a citizen’s right to privacy under these 
amendments is not absolute, and that the Supreme Court cannot arbitrarily decide which things 
are protected and which things are not protected from government invasion. 
The Supreme Court thus, seems to change its stance on the issue of the right to privacy as 
it first explains in Katz v. United States that the right to privacy cannot pertain to issues other 
than searches and seizures; however, in Roe v. Wade seems to take a significantly broad 
interpretation of the Constitution which seems so far from the actual wording of the Constitution 
that it is argued that the Constitution really does not create this so called “right to privacy.”  
The final issue this study analyzed was that of a “compelling state interest.” The Supreme 
Court had three issues which it addressed in Roe v. Wade with the issue of the Texas abortion 
statute. The first was that the Court argued that abortion laws were outdated as they were simply 
used to “illicit sexual conduct.” Secondly, the Court held that the other reason abortion statutes 
still existed is that abortion used to be unsafe for the woman. As long as the women was 
unharmed, the Court argued that abortion would be acceptable. Finally, the Supreme Court 
explained its third reason abortion statutes still existed. This was the “compelling state interest.” 
Essentially, the Court argued that in addition to the health of the woman seeking the abortion, the 
states may be concerned with the prenatal life. The Court noted that even if it could not be 
confirmed that the fetus was alive, the possibility that it may be alive is enough to create a state 
interest.  
Therefore, if a compelling state interest exists, the state may bar that action. In this case 
that would mean barring abortion in Texas, as the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that the 
Texas abortion statute was unconstitutional. In summation the Supreme Court ultimately has 
invented the notion that a “right to privacy” exists under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
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Amendments to the Constitution. As examined, Justice Black has noted in various cases that the 
Constitution does not create a general “right to privacy” which may be applied to any issue the 
Court chooses. The only area which may receive privacy under the Constitution is that pertaining 
to searches and seizures. The Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from certain 
governmental invasions, but as Justice Black noted this is not an absolute right.  Furthermore, he 
also noted that the Supreme Court may not arbitrarily decide which areas may or may not be 
invaded by the government. 
However, it can clearly bee seen that the Supreme Court has taken an extremely broad 
interpretation of the Constitution, and it has arguably given it a meaning which the founders did 
not intend. If this is the case, that the Constitution does not create a general “right to privacy” 
then based upon the Supreme Court’s rational in Roe v. Wade, abortion would be 
unconstitutional as the only reason the Court was able to say it was constitutional is due to the 
fact that they argued there is a right to privacy and this right prevents government interference in 
regard to what a women does with her body. 
The majority in Roe v. Wade in discussing abortion held that: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as 
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to 
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy. (Roe v. Wade, 1973) 
However, Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the “right of privacy” 
does not apply to the case nor does the Fourth Amendment. Justice Rehnquist made the same 
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arguments in Roe v. Wade as did Justice Black in Griswold v. Connecticut and Katz v. United 
States. It is indisputable that the Supreme Court has changed the meaning and application of the 
Fourth Amendment over time. In early cases such as Olmstead v. United States, the Court 
applied the Fourth Amendment only to cases dealing with searches and seizures. However,  in 
later cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut and Katz v. United States the Supreme Court began 
applying the Fourth Amendment to issues not pertaining to issues of searches and seizures and 
essentially interpreted the amendment to mean nothing more than a “right to privacy” from 
government invasion. Justice Black wrote dissenting opinions in such cases and argued that this 
interpretation was not only a stretch but a complete rewrite of the Fourth Amendment which did 
not reflect the meaning of the amendment. Due to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments the Court was able to hold in Roe that: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as 
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to 
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy. (Roe v. Wade, 1973) 
Justice Black argued in similar cases in his dissenting opinions that this type of interpretation of 
these amendments is unconstitutional and Justice Rehnquist made this argument in his dissenting 
opinion in Roe. If these dissenting judges are correct in that the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment only applies to issues concerning searches and seizures, and that the protections 
from governmental invasion found in the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments do not guarantee 
absolute freedom from governmental invasion into a person’s privacy then an argument that 
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abortion should not fall under one of these areas of protection from governmental invasion is a 
legitimate one. 
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